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IN THE WAKE OF HURRICANE ASMUS:'
A LOST OPPORTUNITY IN OUR STRUGGLE
WITH EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOKS
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Story of Benjamin Phired2
Ben Phired used to be a happy man. As his family's sole source
of income, Ben was once able to provide his wife and two children
with a comfortable life. His oldest son, Avery, had just been
admitted to a local private university. Avery would be the first
person in Ben's family to attend college, and Ben was very proud
when he handed his son a check to cover his first semester at school.
This happy life had been possible because of Ben's position as
Chief Superintendent at XYZ Widgets, Inc. ("XYZ"). Ben began
working part-time for XYZ while he was still in high school. By the
time he was ready to graduate from high school in 1981, Ben was
well-liked by everyone at XYZ. Upon graduation, XYZ offered Ben
an entry-level factory position. Ben eagerly accepted XYZ's offer
and began working one week after graduation. Like most XYZ
employees, Ben did not sign or receive a written employment
contract.
3
XYZ makes three kinds of widgets: the X, Y, and Z models.
XYZ's factory is divided into three distinct divisions, each of which
1. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1, 999 P.2d 71, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 179
(2000).
2. This story is a creation of the author and is not intended to depict any
real person or case. However, the unfairness in this story does highlight a
recurring injustice in employment.
3. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 1019 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 5th ed. 2003)
(explaining that, "most employees have no individual written contract which
sets out specific terms of employment or the parties' understandings").
1687
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1687
produces a specific widget model. In his first four years at XYZ,
Ben worked on the production lines for all three widget models.
In 1985, XYZ Widgets issued an employment handbook to all of
its employees. In a section entitled "EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,"
the XYZ handbook articulated the following policy:
(a) Management employees will only be terminated for just
cause.
4
(b) If XYZ Widgets' changing business needs should
require the dissolution of a given managerial position, XYZ
will preserve the manager's job security by offering
reassignment to a comparable position.
(c) This policy shall be maintained until the company
abandons production of one or more widget models.
Since 1985, the company has implemented a policy of providing
all new employees with a copy of the XYZ Employment Handbook
when they are hired.
Later in 1985, Ben was promoted to Superintendent of the Z
model division of XYZ. Ben was ecstatic because this promotion
meant that he was now part of management. Ben believed he was
entitled to enjoy the peace of mind that the handbook's employment
security provisions promised.
In 1990, XYZ promoted Ben a second time, this time to Chief
Superintendent of the Z model division. Ben was to be in charge of
the division's entire labor force, including two subordinate
superintendents, Jack and Jill. By the late 1980s, Ben had become
quite an authority on the production of Z model widgets. Several
other widget companies tried to entice Ben to work for them with a
higher salary. Yet, Ben turned the offers down because he felt secure
in his position at XYZ.
4. See id. at 987. "Just cause" is a term of great legal significance that
essentially makes an employment arrangement, which would otherwise be
presumed terminable for any or no reason, terminable by the employer only if
"cause" exists. Now, as Rothstein and Liebman admit, "The definition of just
cause has been the subject of considerable debate. The seeming simplicity of
the phrase... mask[s] the problem of applying the concept to individual
circumstances. [T]he true test... is whether a reasonable man... would find
sufficient justification in the conduct of the employee to warrant discharge."
Id. (citations omitted).
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His was a false sense of security, however. In November 2002,
after having worked for XYZ for over twenty-one years, Ben found a
thin leaflet in his office mailbox entitled:
XYZ WIDGETS, INC.
NEW EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK:
Provisions to Take Effect January 1, 2003
Ben opened the pamphlet and read the first page. Provision 1
read as follows: "Employment with XYZ Widgets, Inc. is
understood to be on an at-will basis." Though he did not know what
the provision meant, Ben was not overly concerned by the pamphlet.
He filed the pamphlet away and subsequently forgot about it.
In January 2003, Ben returned to work after his winter vacation
to find his division in great turmoil. After meeting with XYZ's
upper management, Ben learned that XYZ had purchased brand-new,
state-of-the-art WidgetmakerPlus machines which had been
delivered to the floor of his factory and needed assembly. This
disturbance had forced Ben's subsidiary superintendents, Jack and
Jill, to suspend Z model widget production until the new machines
were assembled and brought back on line. Although Ben was upset
about not being consulted about the decision to modernize his
division, he rallied his subordinates to accept the technology,
assemble the new Widgetmakers, and get back to production.
By February 2003, the new machines were up and running and
XYZ's Z model division was producing more widgets than ever
before. On a Friday in mid-February, Ben received an office memo
requesting his attendance at an Upper Management Meeting dubbed
"Profit Maximization and XYZ." That afternoon, Ben Phired walked
into the XYZ boardroom totally oblivious to what was about to
happen to him.
Once inside, Ben knew something was amiss. The CEO of XYZ
began, "Mr. Phired, the widget business has changed dramatically
over the last 20 years ....." Ben could hardly react; his world
crumbled in a matter of minutes. The CEO told him that the new
machines enabled the Z division to be more productive than before,
with a labor force one-third its current size. Accordingly, upper
management had decided to downsize the Z division and eliminate
two superintendent positions. The remaining superintendent position
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was to go to Ben's current subordinate, Jill, because she had a
college degree and was more familiar with Z division's new
technology. Ben was to be "let go."
Ben tried to argue that since XYZ was still producing the Z
model, he was entitled to reassignment. The XYZ CEO simply
responded, "That was our old policy. You did get a copy of our new
handbook, didn't you?"
B. Asmus and Employee Handbook Law
If the hypothetical character Ben Phired were to sue his
employer under a breach of implied contract theory5 in California,
not only would he lose, but his suit would likely be dismissed on
summary judgment.6 At first impression, this outcome seems wholly
unfair and hard to justify. However, this is the rule the California
Supreme Court has chosen to apply to the modification of implied
contractual terms in employment handbooks: No matter what the
original provision provides for, the employer is free to amend or
abolish any self-imposed handbook policy by merely issuing another
handbook.7
On June 1, 2000, in Asmus v. Pacific Bell, California failed to
set a sound precedent in a turbulent field of employment law.' The
evolution of American jurisprudence regarding the enforceability of
employment handbooks has been anything but graceful. 9 A review
of the history of the employment arrangement in the United States is
useful for understanding how California missed its opportunity.
Accordingly, Part II of this Note will discuss the "at-will" history of
employment arrangements in the United States, and Part III will
explore the evolution of the handbook exception to the at-will
5. Handbook terms, though expressly set down within the handbook, can
only be incorporated into the employment contract as implied terms of the
contract unless the original employment agreement expressly refers to the
handbook and intends to include its terms. See infra Part III. Since most
original employment contracts contain very few terms other than salary and job
title, and are usually settled over a handshake (like Ben Phired's original
agreement in 1981), handbook provisions are normally incorporated via
implied contract theory. See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1019.
6. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 10.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See infra Parts III-IV.
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presumption. Then, Part IV will discuss the jurisprudence
surrounding the modification of handbook provisions. After painting
the landscape of precedent, Part V will explore two provocative
perspectives on handbook modification that have inspired an
equitable, practicable remedy to the handbook modification
dilemma. Part VI of this Note will announce a solution, apply it to
Ben Phired's unfortunate circumstances, and discuss how California
fumbled an opportunity for progress with its decision in Asmus.
10
American jurisprudence needs to tweak its approach to
handbook modification. Four hundred years ago, Shakespeare's
Shylock accurately portrayed the significance of sustained
employment for all of humanity with his proclamation: "You take
my life / When you.., take the means whereby I live."" These
words have not lost their potency with the passage of time. For
reasons that will be discussed in Part II, however, the law has
struggled to protect an employer's right to revoke employment at
virtually any time and for any reason.12  Moreover, even if the
employer expressly surrenders this right, the law provides the
employer with the freedom to reclaim its abandoned right to fire at
will.' 3 It is this Note's position, however, that where employers
voluntarily create employment handbooks bearing job security
provisions that (1) purport to surrender the right to terminate at-will
and (2) make additional assurances that the provisions will not be
withdrawn until specified times or until the occurrence of specified
conditions, they should be held to honor such assurances.
II. THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
Most American employers hire employees for an indefinite
period of time. 14 In the early years of United States jurisprudence,
many American courts applied the common law "English Rule" to
employment agreements for an indefinite duration. 15 Accordingly,
10. 23 Cal. 4th 1.
11. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part IV (explaining that an employer can promise that an
employee will not be fired at-will, and can later say that the employment has
assumed at-will status once again).
14. See ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 3, at 1019.
15. Stephen Carey Sullivan, Unilateral Modification of Employee
Handbooks: A Contractual Analysis, 5 REGENT U. L. REV. 261, 263 (1995).
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most courts presumed that employment contracts not expressly
addressing duration were to remain in effect for a one-year term.'6
However, under the English Rule parties could avoid the one-
year presumption if they could show that the customary practice in
their given field treated duration differently. 17 As a result of this
glaring loophole in the English Rule, American courts were stymied
by conflicting, yet equally zealous arguments as to what the
customary practices in obscure fields were.'
8
After struggling to distinguish various spheres of employment
and finding themselves ill-equipped to choose between equally
compelling historical interpretations concerning the duration of
employment, many courts determined that the English Rule was
tiresome and unworkable. 19 As a result, many began to assert that all
employees "belonged to a single category., 20  Creating a single
category of employment necessitated the creation of general rules to
apply with equal force to all employees.
In 1877, Horace G. Wood articulated the first expression of the
modern approach to indefinite employment contracts, stating,
"'[T]he rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at-will, and if the [employee] seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof."' 21 "A
hiring at-will" was terminable by the employer or the employee at
any time.22  Wood's treatise stated a clear rule of practical
application that "spread across the nation until it was generally
adopted.
23
16. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425 ("If the hiring be
general.... the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of
equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master [shall] maintain him.").
17. Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 123-24 (1976) (discussing the then-common attempts
to distinguish domestic fields from commercial fields).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 124.
21. Id. at 126 (quoting HORACE GRAY WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT §
134 (1877)) (emphasis added). Remarkably, Wood "offered no policy grounds
for the rule he proclaimed" and cases he cited in support "were in fact far off
the mark." Feinman, supra note 17, at 126.
22. See Feinman, supra note 17, at 126.
23. Id. (citing 1 C.B. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT, § 159, at 519 n.4 (1913)).
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Today, United States courts generally presume employment
arrangements to be at-will.24  Generally, both employers and
employees are allowed to terminate their relationship "at any time
[and] for any reason."25 However, it is a matter of absolute certainty
that employers and employees may expressly alter the nature of their
agreements. Accordingly, written individual employment contracts
and collective bargaining agreements regularly aim to restrict or
supersede the at-will presumption. 26  Furthermore, modem
developments in the law governing labor and employment have
27yielded several implied exceptions to the at-will presumption.
Most "jurisdictions have been willing to depart from the... rule of
terminability at will and to impose an implied.., duty not to
discharge an employee for reasons.., violative of public policy
[and] to recognize the tortious nature of a discharge violative of
public policy."
28
One of the implied exceptions most widely recognized across all
jurisdictions is "the promulgation of corporate employment policies
specifying the procedures or grounds for discharge" ("corporate
24. This presumption echoes Wood's discussion of the employee's
"burden." See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25. Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling Down:
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's
Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 375 (2002). This Note does acknowledge the
common law tort for wrongful termination in violation of public policy and the
various statutory restraints on an employer's right to terminate. However, for
the purpose of this argument, all terminations are assumed to be in compliance
with these areas of the law.
26. See Rebecca Hanner White, Section 301 's Preemption of State Law
Claims: A Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1990).
27. For a more complete discussion of these exceptions to the at-will
employment doctrine, see Maureen S. Binetti et al., The Employment-at- Will
Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule? Common Law Limitations
Upon an Employer's Control over Employees-At-Will, in I PRACTICING LAW
INST., HANDLING WRONGFUL TERMINATION CLAIMS: WHAT PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS HAVE TO KNOW 577 (2001) (addressing handbooks, oral
promises, bonuses, course of dealing, fear of litigation, and more).
28. Theresa Ludwig Kruk, Annotation, Right to Discharge Allegedly 'At-
Will' Employee as Affected by Employer's Promulgation of Employment
Policies as to Discharge, 33 A.L.R. 4TH 120, 123 (1984 & Supp. 2001)
(discussing the tort for wrongful discharge and its effect on the at-will
doctrine).
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policy exception"). 29  These policies can restrict "employer[s']
traditional freedom in employment matters" by binding them to their
own self-inflicted policies.30
III. THE HANDBOOK EXCEPTION
The employee handbook is arguably the most established and
important illustration of the corporate policy exception to at-will
employment. The proliferation of employment handbook
jurisprudence has revolutionized the nature of American employment
law. 31 Chief Justice Wilentz explains the exception genre as a
situation where an employee:
[h]aving been employed . . . without any individual
employment contract, by an employer whose good
reputation made [the employment] so attractive ... is given
this one document [the handbook] that purports to set forth
the terms and conditions of his employment, a document
obviously carefully prepared by the [employer] company
with all of the appearances of corporate legitimacy that one
could imagine.
32
Consider Ben Phired.33 Upon his graduation from high school,
Ben began working for XYZ in 1981 without any written
employment contract. Thus, at that point his employment should
have been considered terminable at-will. However, once Ben was
promoted to management and XYZ issued its first handbook
promising that management would "only be terminated for just
cause," most courts would hold that the at-will presumption no
longer applied and that Ben's employment could only be terminated
for cause.
34
Yet, there are opponents to the employee handbook exception
who contend that employment contracts without duration provisions
are, by definition, indefinite contracts. 35 They argue that even when
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 124.
31. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1265 (N.J.
1985).
32. Id.
33. See supra Part I.A.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
35. See generally David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial
Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373 (1990) (discussing how courts
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implied discharge provisions (like those that exist in employment
handbooks) are incorporated in the employment contract, the
agreement remains indefinite.36 These opponents emphasize the
general rule that all contracts of indefinite duration are terminable at
will.37 They therefore conclude that indefinite employment contracts
with implied discharge provisions are also terminable at will.
38
Appreciating, however, that employees rely on the job security
provisions within the handbooks that their employers issue,
"virtually all states recognize some form of handbook exception to
the presumption of employment at-will. 39  Still, considerable
dispute exists regarding how legal theory supports the handbook
exception.
4 0
Some state jurisdictions cite public policy concerns as the basis
for incorporating handbook provisions into otherwise indefinite
employment contracts. 41  The Michigan Supreme Court was the
harbinger of this rationale and remains its most fervent devotee.42 In
1980 the Michigan Supreme Court was confronted "with the
question of whether a discharge-for-cause policy contained in a
personnel manual was binding on [an employer,] Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan." 43 The court held that because the discharge
policy caused the employee to develop "legitimate expectations
determine which commitments parties intended to make legally enforceable
when they enforce non-legal sanctions).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Walters, supra note 25, at 379 (emphasis added). It appears that
Missouri is the only state to have expressly rejected the handbook exception to
employment at-will. See, e.g., Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745
S.W.2d 661, 661-62 (Mo. 1988) ("Transfer was granted to decide whether
there is a 'handbook exception' to the employment at will doctrine in Missouri.
This Court declines to adopt such an exception and recognizes the continued
validity of employment at will.")
40. Walters, supra note 25, at 379.
41. For opinions relying on public policy as their basis for incorporating
handbook provisions, see Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814,
816 (Ala. 1984) (Beatty, J., dissenting) (opinion later adopted by majority);
Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co. (In re Certified Question), 443 N.W.2d 112
(Mich. 1989); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980).
42. See Bankey, 443 N.W.2d 112; Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d 880.
43. Walters, supra note 25, at 380.
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grounded in [the] employer's written policy statements set forth in
the manual of personnel policies," the employer was bound by the
policy.44 The court concluded that employers would be unduly
advantaged if the law did not honor "a policy to dismiss for cause
only.' '45 The "employer may not depart from [a] policy at whim
simply because he was under no obligation to institute the policy in
the first place. Having announced the policy.., with a view to
obtaining [its] benefit.., the employer may not treat its promise as
illusory.' '46  The Michigan Supreme Court found that balancing
legitimate employee expectations against the theory of indefinite
contracts tips in favor of enforcing the employee's reasonable
expectation.47 Although few courts find this analysis determinative,
the public policy rationale is regularly a key aspect of other
handbook-related arguments.4a
In contrast, most states apply some form of unilateral contract
theory to justify the incorporation of handbook provisions into
indefinite employment contracts. 49 "[A] promise that is given in
exchange for performance is a 'unilateral contract."' 50 Performance
by the party to whom the offer is made constitutes both acceptance
44. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
45. Id. at 895.
46. Id. (The court explains that the potential "benefit[s]" to the employer
include "improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of
the work force").
47. Id. (holding that disappointing the employee's reasonable expectations
violated public policy).
48. See infra Part IV.
49. See, e.g., Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley Cmty. Servs., Inc., 19 F.3d 359
(7th Cir. 1994); Exparte Amoco Fabrics & Fibers Co., 729 So. 2d 336 (Ala.
1998); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987);
Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138 (Ariz. 1999); Ferrera v. Nielsen, 799
P.2d 458 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.,
Inc., 662 A.2d 89 (Conn. 1995); Parker v. Boise Telco Fed. Credit Union, 923
P.2d 493 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996); Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 1140
(Ill. 1999); Elliott v. Bd. of Trs., 655 A.2d 46 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995);
Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 603 N.E.2d 1126 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991);
Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 1994); Trombley v.
Southwestern Vt. Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 103 (Vt. 1999); Gaglidari v. Denny's
Rests., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991); Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker Mach. Co.,
431 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1993); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263
(Wyo. 1997).
50. WILLIAM McGOVERN ET AL., CONTRACTS AND SALES:
CONTEMPORARY CASES AND PROBLEMS § 3.01, at 64 (2d ed. 2002).
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and consideration for a unilateral contract.51 Once a party has fully
performed, the offering party is bound to its promise.5 2  Most
jurisdictions characterize "[a]t-will employment contracts [as]
unilateral... typically start[ing] with an employer's offer of a wage
in exchange for work performed.
53
When an employer introduces a personnel handbook containing
provisions for dismissal or assurances of job security,54 jurisdictions
basing the handbook exception on unilateral contract theory
recognize that "it is a question of fact whether that promise [i.e., the
handbook provision] was reasonably understood by the employee to
create a contractual obligation." 55 These courts apply "traditional
contract formation [analysis], including issues regarding offer,
acceptance and consideration," when analyzing handbook
provisions.56 To form a contractual obligation, the handbook
provision must be "definite in form and must be communicated to
the offeree .... [W]here an at-will employee retains employment
with knowledge of new or changed conditions, the new or changed
conditions may become a contractual obligation." 57 Therefore, the
employer circulating the handbook is bound.
IV. VARIED APPROACHES ACROSS JURISDICTIONS REGARDING THE
MODIFICATION OF HANDBOOK PROVISIONS
As the handbook exception to the doctrine of at-will
employment began to gain general acceptance in the 1980s,
employers began "examining the handbooks they issued to their
51. See ROTHSTEIN & LEIBMAN, supra note 3, at 1032-33 n.3.
52. See E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.4 (3d ed. 1999). Note that
when an employee has "fully performed" is an unclear, if not an impossible
question. It is a question often addressed by opponents of the handbook
exception, though to little avail. See Walters, supra note 25, at 383-84.
However, this fact plays an additional role in the debate surrounding
modification of handbook provisions. See infra Part IV.
53. Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1142-43.
54. For example, such provisions often state that an employee will only be
dismissed for good cause or that an employee with five or more years tenure
will not be released before an employee with less than five years tenure.
55. Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal. 4th 454, 464, 904 P.2d 834, 839,
46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 433 (1995).
56. Walters, supra note 25, at 383.
57. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Minn.
1983).
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employees .... [M]any employers ... began issuing new or revised
handbooks which both deleted all passages capable of being
interpreted as sufficient to constitute an offer for just cause
employment and inserted an 'at-will disclaimer' in their place."
58
The legal analysis applied in the resulting litigation has been
inconsistent at best.5 9 While the modem trend has largely embraced
the handbook exception to at-will employment as a consistent
application of unilateral contract theory,60 no legal consensus has
been reached regarding the modification of these contracts.
61
A. Requiring Explicit Acceptance for Handbook Modification
One modification theory requires a heightened manifestation of
employee assent before an attempted modification of handbook
provisions can take legal effect. In these jurisdictions, continued
employment does not constitute approval of the handbook
modification.62 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia reached this conclusion in Thompson v. Kings
Entertainment Co. 63 In 1980 an amusement park issued a handbook
to its employees indicating that they would only be dismissed "for
cause." 64 The park employed Thompson.65 In July of 1985, the
park, now under new ownership, issued a new employment
handbook indicating that all park employees were terminable at
will. 66 One month later, Thompson was dismissed; subsequently, he
67brought an action for breach of his employment contract.
Thompson presented the court with the task of determining whether
"the handbook issued in 1985 superseded the handbook issued in
58. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 281. Although considerable disagreement
exists regarding the enforceability of such disclaimers in the face of job
security provisions within the same handbook, the focus of this Note will
address what effect, if any, the new handbook should have on the validity of
the old handbook.
59. See supra notes 24-28.
60. See supra notes 27-30 (binding the employer).
61. See Walters, supra note 25, at 384-400.
62. See Thompson v. Kings Entm't Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Va.
1987).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1195.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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1980, thus making Mr. Thompson an at-will employee regardless of
the effect of the earlier handbook's provisions.,
6 8
The Thompson court decided that the 1985 handbook did not
supersede the 1980 version.69 The court rationalized that there was
"no basis for treating the two documents differently. [Just] as with
the 1980 Manual, the 1985 Handbook will be construed as an offer
of employment terms which Thompson could accept or reject. 7 °
The court concluded that Thompson had, in fact, rejected the terms
in the new handbook.7' Accordingly, the court ruled in favor of
Thompson under the terms of the first handbook.72
It is difficult, however, to support the court's claim that the two
handbooks were not treated differently. The court deemed
Thompson to have accepted the first handbook by way of his
continued employment after its introduction. 73 Yet, he was deemed
not to have accepted the terms of the second handbook when he
continued to work for the amusement park after its introduction.
74
Instead, the court required the park to "demonstrate that Thompson
was aware of the [1985] Handbook, that he understood that its terms
governed his employment, and that he worked according to those
terms" for the attempted modification of the terms of the first
handbook to be binding. 75  The court's stricter standard of
acceptance for the provisions of the second handbook could be
explained by an underlying sympathy for Thompson's position and
an unwritten concurrence with the public policy sentiments
expressed by the Michigan courts.76 However, this kind of judicial
sympathy, though admirable and arguably justifiable when the
particular facts of this case are considered, fails to articulate a clear
and consistent rule for employers to follow when attempting to
modify their handbooks. The Thompson court seems to conclude
68. Sullivan, supra note 15, at 282-83.
69. Thompson, 674 F. Supp at 1198.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1198-99. The court summarily concluded that Thompson
necessarily rejected the 1985 handbook because he did not expressly assent to
it. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1197.
74. Id at. 1198-99.
75. Idat 1198.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 41-48.
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that continued employment will constitute an employee's acceptance
of a handbook's terms only if judicial whim favors such an
interpretation.
B. Requiring Additional Consideration for Handbook Modification
Some jurisdictions have held that employers must provide
additional consideration and obtain the employee's express assent in
order to modify an employment handbook.77 In 1994 the Seventh
Circuit articulated this theory in Robinson v. Ada S. McKinley
Community Services, Inc.78 In that case, Robinson had been
employed by McKinley as the director of a foster care facility.79 Her
employment had been subject to the terms of "McKinley's 1978
Personnel Policies Manual (the '1978 Manual'). 80 The 1978 Manual
provided: [p]ermanent employment status is attained upon
successful completion of the [six month] tenure probation period
with the Agency." 81 Robinson had been director of the foster care
facility for over seven years when she received a new 1986
Personnel Policies Manual. 82  The new handbook expressly
expunged the job security provisions of the 1978 Manual.83
McKinley fired Robinson three years after introducing the 1986
Manual.84
After determining that "the language" of the 1978 job security
provision contained "'a promise clear enough that an employee
would reasonably believe that an offer has been made, ' 85 the
Seventh Circuit determined that McKinley must provide additional
"consideration to support this purported modification, there must be
some benefit to Robinson, detriment to McKinley, or Robinson's
77. Alabama, Arizona, and Illinois have adopted this approach. See
Walters, supra note 25, at 390-98.
78. 19 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 360.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 361 (quoting Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505
N.E. 2d. 314, 318 (1987)). This factual inquiry is a complicated determination
as acknowledged by the court in Scott v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 Cal. 4th 454
(1995). See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. However, for the purposes
of this Note, it is assumed that handbook provisions are sufficiently clear.
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continued work under the 1986 Manual must have been a bargained
for exchange." 86  "The court found McKinley's argument that
Robinson assented to the modification when she continued to work
under the terms of the 1986 Manual to be unpersuasive" 87 and
"contrary to basic contract principles and notions of fairness." 88
Still, Robinson does not expressly clarify why Robinsons's assent to
the 1978 Manual by way of continued employment can be
distinguished from her continued employment after the introduction
of the 1986 modification.
89
C. Allowing Unilateral Modification
Conversely, some jurisdictions hold that an employer may
unilaterally modify its handbook provisions. In Sadler v. Basin
Electric Power Cooperative,9" the Supreme Court of North Dakota
adopted this perspective. 91 Sadler worked for Basin Electric for four
years before receiving the first in a series of four handbooks, all
stating, "'[P]ermanent employees cannot be terminated without a just
cause.' 92 The third handbook defined "just cause" for termination
as "referring to insubordination, theft, etcetera." 93  The fourth
handbook included "'lack of work or a continued need for the
position"' in its definition of just cause.94 Basin discharged Sadler
pursuant to the fourth handbook's standards for just cause
termination when its business plan called for "reduction[s]-in-
force." 95 The court seems to adopt the language of a Washington
state court to articulate its canon in this area:
86. Robinson, 19 F.2d at 364.
87. Walters, supra note 25, at 393.
88. Robinson, 19 F.3d at 363.
89. And although a palatable argument could be made on the facts of this
case because the first handbook did provide Robinson with some benefit and
the second did not, would this court really have honored the 1986 manual if it
had conferred to Robinson a new benefit, like a cafeteria per diem, while
revoking her job security?
90. 431 N.W. 2d 296 (N.D. 1988).
91. Id. at 300.
92. Id. at 297 (emphasis added) (quoting the 1980 employee handbook).
Sadler received handbooks in 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1985. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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[T]he employer can define the work relationship. Once an
employer takes action, for whatever reasons, an employee
must either accept those changes, quit, or be discharged.
Because the employer retains this control over the
employment relationship, unilateral acts of the employer are
binding on his employees and both parties should
understand this rule.
96
D. Reasonable Notice
Many jurisdictions,97 joined most recently by the California
Supreme Court in Asmus v. Pacific Bell, allow unilateral
modification of handbook provisions provided that employers
"reasonably and timely" warn their employees of a looming
handbook modification before it takes effect.98  This perspective
attempts to blend Sadler (allowing the employer to "define" the
employment arrangement) with the philosophical bedrock of those
jurisdictions that justify the very existence of the handbook
exception with public policy, i.e., preserving the reasonable
expectations of the employee. These jurisdictions follow unilateral
contract theory, believing that the same reliance that made the first
handbook enforceable, as manifested by the employee's continued
work, should function as reasonable acceptance of the second
handbook/modification as long as the employee is forewarned of its
terms.99 Accordingly, the modification terms are enforceable if
employers provide employees with a "reasonable amount of time"
with which to consider the new terms and make a rational decision as
to whether they want to accept the terms and continue working or
quit.100
The facts surrounding Asmus are particularly interesting.10' In
1986 Pacific Bell issued its "Management Employment Security
Policy" (MESP) which promised job security to its management
96. Id. at 300 (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081,
1087 (Wash. 1984)).
97. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880
(Mich. 1980).
98. See Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1 (2000).
99. See, e.g., id. at 15; Sadler, 431 N.W.2d at 300; Ryan v. Dan's Food
Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998).
100. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 14.
101. See infra Part VI.
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employees "through reassignment to, and retraining for, other
management positions, even if their present jobs [were]
eliminated."' 10 2  The MESP also promised that the job security
policies it contained would, "be maintained so long as there [was] no
change that [would] materially affect Pacific Bell's business plan
achievement."' 0 3 In 1990 Pacific Bell announced that it "could...
discontinue its MESP." 1°4 Sure enough, in October 1991, Pacific
Bell notified its managers that it was withdrawing its MESP
policies. 10 5 Predictably, in April 1992, Pacific Bell began its "new
layoff policy (the Management Force Adjustment Program)" for
management employees. 106 Eight former Pacific Bell Management
Employees sought redress from Pacific Bell for what they believed
constituted a contractual breach of the MESP policies. 0 7 During the
course of the trial, the parties entered into a stipulation "providing in
part that Pacific Bell 'elected not to present any further evidence...
with respect to the question of whether there has been "a change that
will materially alter Pacific Bell's business plan achievement."
' ' ' 108
Thus, the lower court assumed, for the purpose of its analysis, that
Pacific Bell's written condition for the termination of its MESP
policies had not occurred.'0 9
As the litigation progressed, the California Supreme Court
attempted to answer the following certified question as posed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Once an
employer's unilaterally adopted policy-which requires employees
to be retained so long as a specified condition does not occur-has
become. a part of the employment contract, may the employer
thereafter unilaterally [terminate]"° the policy, even though the
102. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 7.
103. Id.
104. Id. (emphasis added). The court deemed this announcement to satisfy
the reasonable notice requirement.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id. at 9 (quoting the stipulation (quoting MESP)).
109. See generally Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1 (2001). In other words,
no condition or change occurred that "materially affect[ed] Pacific Bell's
business plan achievement." Id. at 7.
110. The Ninth Circuit originally used the term "rescind," however, Justice
Chin restated the question using the term "terminate" because the legal
definition of "rescission" indicates "a statutorily governed event that
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specified condition has not occurred?"' 1 1 If the court had answered
with a resounding "no," the former Pacific Bell employees would
likely have prevailed on their claim.
Unfortunately, the court did not answer "no" to the certified
question; but nor did it exactly answer, "yes." The court wrenched
itself into a position that highlights the jurisprudential anguish
experienced by many modem courts. The result of the Asmus
decision is a body of law unsuccessfully struggling to reconcile the
Sadler-esque notion of unilateral contract freedom with the public
policy rationale that supports the enforcement of the handbook
provisions: the legitimate expectations of employees.'
12
In an unnatural effort to appease the conflicting mandates of its
own precedent, the Asmus court first sought to extensively criticize
the purportedly vague nature of the specified condition." 3  Even
though MESP did expressly define "changes [as conditions] that
would have a significant negative effect on the company's rate of
return, earnings, and, 'ultimately the viability of [its] business,"' the
court criticized the potentially indefinite duration of the MESP
condition. 1
14
Next, the court explained that this critique is corroborated by
Pacific Bell's own testimony that if such a change were to occur "it
would result from forces beyond Pacific Bell's control, and would
include 'major changes in the economy or the public policy
arena. ,,115
extinguishes a contract as if it never existed." Id. at 6 n.2. Pacific Bell did
acknowledge that a contract once existed, they were simply arguing that they
had the authority to terminate that contract at-will. Id. at 11.
111. Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). This is the focal
question of this note. See infra Part VI.
112. Compare Thompson, 674 F. Supp. 1194, and supra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text, with Sadler, 431 N.W.2d 296, and supra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
113. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 16-17.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. (quoting a Pacific Bell spokesperson). However, as Chief Justice
George's dissent appropriately notes, "the condition allowing termination of
the MESP is ascertainable and specifies a definite duration for the MESP....
[N]ot even Pacific Bell contends that such a change cannot be measured in a
reasonable manner." Id. at 19 (George, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, courts
have generally refused to allow the defense of "indefiniteness" to invalidate
employment security provisions. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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Finally, the court concluded with a convoluted rule that side-
stepped the original certified question. 116 Accordingly, California's
current rule regarding modification of unilateral job security
provisions with specified conditions reads as follows: "An employer
may terminate a written employment security policy that contains a
specified condition, if the condition is one of indefinite duration and
the employer makes the change after a reasonable time, on
reasonable notice, and without interfering with the employees'
vested benefits." 11 7  Unfortunately, most specified conditions as
attached to employment security policies would probably be
considered sufficiently definite in duration, i.e., not "indefinite.""
8
California does not have a rule addressing termination or
modification of employment security provisions with sufficiently
definite specified conditions." 19
V. ACADEMIC SOLUTIONS
Jason A. Walters and Brian Kohn, have each published works
that address the quandary surrounding attempted unilateral
modifications of job security provisions in employment
handbooks. 120 This Note argues that their proposed solutions, though
slightly off the mark, will comprise the cornerstones of a just and
feasible solution to this issue.
A. Handbooks Viewed As Option Contracts
In 2002 Jason A. Walters published an article suggesting that
job security provisions should be treated as creating option
contracts. 12 Walters argues that justices who believe an employee's
continued employment constitutes acceptance of an employer's
116. See Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 19 (George, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority,
however, inexplicably answers a different question...
117. Id. at 18.
118. Courts have generally refused to allow the defense of "indefiniteness"
to invalidate employment security provisions. See supra text accompanying
notes 22-25.
119. See Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 18. The court fails to distinguish provisions
with specified conditions.
120. Walters, supra note 25; Brian T. Kohn, Contracts of Convenience:
Preventing Employers From Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in
Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 799 (2003).
121. Walters, supra note 25, at 412.
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attempted termination of a job security provision "fail to recognize
that the agreement being modified is the option contract, not the
unilateral contract. The unilateral contract has yet to be accepted
(and the option contract is still in effect) because the employee has
not completed performance.' 22 Under classic option contract law,
the offeree has the right to continue performing under the original
offer (i.e., the original job security provision), which the offeror is
prohibited from revoking. 123  Accordingly, Walters's theory
supposes that employers/offerors must provide additional bargained
for consideration 24 to their employees/offerees if they hope to be
relieved of their contractual obligations under their job security
provisions/option contracts.
25
Walters's theory, though provocative in its simplicity, would
likely run into criticism from the drafters of the Restatement Second
of Contracts § 45: Option Contract Created By Part Performance Or
Tender. 126  Comment b to this Restatement Section succinctly
expresses the rationale and limitation of this rule: "The rule of this
Section is designed to protect the offeree in justifiable reliance on
the offeror's promise, and the rule yields to a manifestation of
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1981) ("The
rule of this Section is designed to protect the offeree in justifiable reliance on
the offeror's promise .... ).
124. This is actually an oversimplification of Walters's theory. Walters
actually argues that, "[a]bsent some additional indication of... assent" courts
should not hold that employees/offerees are "bound by the terms of [a] revised
handbook simply because they continued working." Walters, supra note 25, at
416. Walters believes Chief Justice George's dissent in Asmus "erred when it
stated that handbook modification required additional consideration." Id.
However, to the best of my knowledge, Walters's notion of an "additional
indication of assent" is indistinguishable from the common legal conception of
mutual consideration, which need not be ostensibly equal in "value." See
McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 50, at 104 (stating that mutuality of obligation
"does not require that the promisee actually have conferred a benefit or
suffered a detriment") (emphasis added).
125. Walters, supra note 25, at 416.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1981). That
section is based on 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 60-60B (3d ed. 1957); 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 49-52 (1963 & Supp. 1980); L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 410-17
(1937); K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, II,
48 YALE L.J. 779, 802-18 (1939).
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intention which makes reliance unjustified.',127 Walters explains that
the return performance that an employer seeks is the employees'
"employment for as long as the [employees] desire[] to continue
working" in any capacity. 128 Accordingly, Walters probably assumes
that the employee's belief-that a job security option in a handbook
will be valid for as long as the particular employee chooses to work
for the offering employer-is reasonable and thus, justifiable. Yet,
considering the at-will history of employment arrangement, the
employer's status as "master 129 of the employment agreement, and
the broad stroke with which employment handbooks are generally
issued, it seems possible that a strong argument could be made for
the position that such reliance is not reasonably justifiable. 
130
B. Implied Promises Not to Modify
In 2003 Brian Kohn published an article in which he
recommended that all handbook provisions be read to imply a
promise not to modify any resultant contractual obligations.'
3'
"Under this proposed model, an employer could not unilaterally
revise the terms of an employee handbook without rendering the
initial employment contract illusory."'132 Consequently, an employer
who desires to modify a handbook provision must garner the
employee's "consent to the alteration and [the employee must]
receive additional consideration."'
133
Kohn supports his argument for an implied promise not to
modify with the famous case, Drennan v. Star Paving Co.,13 4 and
with the Oregon Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Multnomah
County Deputy Sheriffs Retirement Board.35 The Drennan court
ruled that a subcontractor's construction bid implies a promise not to
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1981) (emphasis
added).
128. Walters, supra note 25, at 416.
129. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 50, at 63 note 4 ("The offeror is the
master of the offer....").
130. See supra Parts 11-111.
131. Kohn, supra note 120, at 842.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 844-45 (citing Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333
P.2d 757 (1958); Taylor v. Multnomah County Deputy Sheriff's Ret. Bd., 510
P.2d 339 (Or. 1973)).
135. 510 P.2d 339.
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revoke or modify when a general contractor relies upon the
subcontractor's bid in making a prime bid to a project owner.
136
Unfortunately for Kohn's position, "courts have not widely utilized
[Drennan] outside of the [construction] bid context."'37
In contrast, the Taylor decision was born out of an employment
dispute.138 In Taylor, the court held that a provision for retirement
security implied a promise not to unilaterally modify the retirement
plan. 139 Taylor actually supports Jason Walters's argument better
than Kohn's because the Taylor court relied heavily on the
Restatement Second of Contracts § 45 in characterizing the
employer's retirement plan as an option contract. 140 As such, this
argument runs into the same problems with regards to whether total
reliance on an indefinite job security provision in a handbook is
genuinely justifiable.141
VI. A NEW RULE
A. Ben Phired, Options, and Implied Promises
Recall our unhappy friend Ben Phired. 142 Section (C) of the
employment security policy in XYZ's first employment handbook
(the 1985 version) promised:
(C) This policy is to be maintained until production of one
or more widget models is abandoned by XYZ Widgets, Inc.
This clause specifies when XYZ's employment security provisions
will lose their permanence. Phrased in a different way, XYZ , via the
terms of its 1985 handbook, both promised that its job security policy
would remain in place as long as the company continued to
manufacture X, Y, and Z model widgets, and warned that if
production of any widget model were abandoned the employment
security policies would likely be abandoned as well. In light of such
an assuring promise, it would seem that employees would be
136. Drennan, 51 Cal. 2d at 413-15.
137. Kohn, supra note 120, at 844.
138. Id. at 844-45.
139. Taylor, 510 P.2d at 342-43.
140. See id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
142. See supra Part I.
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"reasonably justified" 143 in relying on such a promise, believing that
their job security would remain intact as long as their company
continued to produce X, Y, and Z model widgets.
"The offeror is the master of the offer and may dictate the mode
of acceptance."' 44 Employers like XYZ choose performance as their
preferred method of acceptance when they unilaterally issue
employment handbooks to their employees. 145 By this method, when
an employee continues to work after being issued a handbook, the
employee has accepted the employer's offer. 146 Building on the keen
insight of Jason A. Walters and Brian Kohn, this Note avers that
when an employer (1) issues an employment handbook (2) with an
employment security provision (3) that also contains a condition
assuring the reliability of that provision, courts should find that an
option contract has been created by the employee's continued
employment and should imply a promise on the part of the employer
not to modify the provision in the absence of the specified
condition.
147
B. A Technically Sound Solution
This transformation of Walters's and Kohn's concepts avoids
the criticisms and downfalls they each originally encountered, while
protecting the interests of employees like Ben Phired. Recall that
Walters thought that all attempted modifications of handbook
provisions should create option contracts for as long as the employee
desired to work for the employer.148 As discussed, such a belief on
the part of the employee could be deemed "unjustifiable reliance,"
thus invalidating the option.' 49 Yet, when an employer expressly
provides a condition dictating a policy's lifespan (like XYZ's policy
in section c of its 1985 handbook), an employee's reliance on that
option for the duration expressly specified is, arguably, far more
reasonable.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. b (1981).
144. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 50, at 63 note 4.
145. W. David Slawson, Unilateral Contracts of Employment: Does
Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 9, 21
(2003).
146. See id.
147. See discussion infra Part VI.B-C.
148. Walters, supra note 25, at 416.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. c (1981).
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In addition to stumbling upon "reasonableness" barricades
similar to those encountered by Walters, recall that Kohn's argument
for an "implied promise not to revoke" also ran up against the weight
of precedent expressly limiting such implied promises to bidding
scenarios.' 50  However, if the implied promise is limited to those
scenarios where the employer has expressly provided that:
"A ,,151 will remain in effect until "B , 152 happens,
the position is stronger. Under this limited circumstance, the implied
promise is simply a negative restatement of the express assurance
and would not necessitate expanding the law surrounding bidding to
the employment setting.
Take the above example and consider only its express assurance
clause:
.. will remain in effect until "B " happens.
Now consider the negative restatement of the express assurance
clause:
... will not be modified or revoked until "B'" happens.
This is identical to the implied promise sought by Kohn if the
implication is limited to situations where the employer has made an
express assurance! In essence the employer is saying,
Ipromise not to modify or revoke "A " until "B " happens.
Accordingly, employers, hoping to prematurely alter or abolish
unilaterally formed employment security policies bearing assurances
that have yet to expire, would have to provide additional
consideration (possibly by negotiating an adequate severance
package) and acquire express assent to effectuate a modification.
153
C. Advancing the Interests ofAll Parties
Limiting the rule proposed by Walters and Kohn in this way
would benefit the employer as well as the employee (and even the
150. See supra Part V.B (discussing where a general contractor relies on the
offer/bid of a subcontractor in making the prime bid to the project owner).
151. "A" indicates any employment security policy.
152. "B" indicates any sufficiently definite condition or specified time
period.
153. Interestingly, the claims of fifty-two of the plaintiffs to the original
Asmus suit were dismissed because Pacific Bell had negotiated a severance
deal with them and obtained their signed consent to MESP's termination.
Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 23 Cal. 4th 1, 8 (2001).
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courts). Employers would be confident in their future freedom
to modify 54 after issuing employment policies not containing
assurances of permanence.' 55  Conversely, employers would
understand the gravity of additional express assurances, if they did
eventually choose to include them in their handbooks.
Obviously, employees would reap an equitable benefit from
such a rule. They would be forewarned not to rely wholeheartedly
on the permanence of bald job security provisions in their employers'
handbooks. On the other hand, employees like Ben Phired could not
be duped by stark language, promising policy permanence for a
specified period, because employers would be held to such
assurances.
Finally, the courts would also welcome the precision of this rule.
The system would no longer have to grapple with multiple
diametrically opposed principles in determining whether to apply an
old or a new handbook. 156 Under the proposed rule, if handbooks
included an unmet condition assuring policy adherence, employees
would be justified in relying on the old policies. Conversely, if the
policy did not contain such an assurance, employers would be
justified in modifying their policies once their employees accepted
the offered modifications by way of their continued
performance/employment.1
57
D. California's Step Backward
As indicated, California missed a golden opportunity to
distinguish between provisions with assurances and those without
assurances in Asmus v. Pacific Bell. With this certified question, the
Ninth Circuit invited the California Supreme Court to recognize and
defend the Asmus plaintiffs' reasonable reliance: "'Once an
employer's unilaterally adopted policy-which requires employees
to be retained so long as a specified condition does not occur-has
become a part of the employment contract, may the employer
154. This is after providing reasonable notice to the employee, of course.
155. See Slawson, supra note 145, at 11. ("The public policy [is] the need
for management flexibility to meet changing business conditions.").
156. Compare Robinson v. Ada S. Mckinley Cmty. Servs., Inc., 19 F.3d
359 (7th Cir. 1994), with Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 431 N.W.2d 296
(N.D. 1988); see supra Part IV.
157. See Slawson, supra note 145.
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thereafter unilaterally [terminate] the policy, even though the
specified condition has not occurred?"",158 The court could have
responded:
No, the employer may not terminate the policy without first
providing additional consideration to the employees and
obtaining their consent. A unilateral job security policy
with a specified condition creates an option contract that
implies a promise not to terminate the policy until the
occurrence of the condition. The employee has the option
to enjoy the policy's security until the condition occurs.
The employee exercises this option through the form of
acceptance chosen by the employer: performance, i.e., by
continuing to work for the employer.' 
59
Had it done so, it could have established a precise general rule and
then proceeded to define and distinguish the exceptions.
1 60
Regrettably, as the dissent in Asmus points out, the majority
chose to answer a question it was not asked and which the facts of
the case do not adequately support:
Once an employer's unilaterally adopted employment
security policy-which indicates that certain employees
will be retained unless a vague and formless condition
happens to occur-has become a part of the employment
contract, may the employer thereafter unilaterally modify
the policy, even though the flimsy condition seems not to
have occurred?
16 1
The court's answer to its self-imposed question, though possibly
justifiable, 62 did a disservice to California jurisprudence. The Ninth
Circuit's certified question crystallized the court's construction of the
158. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 5-6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
(alterations by the Asmus court).
159. This "answer" is a creation of the Note, incorporating the change for the
law as proposed in Part VI.A.
160. Such a situation would possibly arise when a condition was found
insufficiently definite or to conflict with a disclaimer.
161. This "certified question" is a creation of the author and was developed
from the Asmus court's arguably improper answer to its certified question.
Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th at 19 (George, C.J., dissenting) ("The majority, however,
inexplicably answers a different question .... ").
162. See supra note 155 (noting potential exceptions to the proposed rule,
including indefinite conditions).
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Asmus facts; it had already been determined that the MESP job
security policy contained a sufficiently definite specified condition
that did not occur.' 63  The question inquired was whether the
employer could unilaterally modify such a policy. By reinterpreting
the facts, concluding that the MESP condition was indefinite, and
purporting to answer the question by announcing that such indefinite
policies may be unilaterally terminated, the Asmus court scuttled the
precedent value of its decision. Lower courts are left with the
onerous task of determining when and how to apply the holding.
Whether all conditional job security provisions can be unilaterally
modified, or only those with indefinite conditions, is a legal question
answerable only by the most persuasive advocate on a given day.
Accordingly, the Asmus decision has provided employers with an
escape hatch from the promises to which the law should strive most
earnestly to bind them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Employers, especially large corporate employers, need latitude
and flexibility in defining and changing the employment status of
their workforce.164 Compelling employers to bargain and negotiate
on an individual basis with each employee whenever they changed
their handbooks would impose an undue burden on business.
165
However, when an employer voluntarily promises employment
security and makes an additional written assurance that the promised
security will remain in effect until a specific event occurs, the
employer has taken extraordinary steps to create the appearance of
ironclad, irrevocable job security. Such an extraordinary guarantee,
a promise bearing all the hallmarks of contractual legitimacy, should
be reliable and enforceable.
If these handbook policies were read to create enforceable
option contracts, wouldn't justice be served? Clearly the resultant
163. Asmus, 23 Cal. 4th 1.
164. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
165. See id.
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burden on those employers consciously choosing to issue such
provocative policies would not exist, were it not self-imposed.
John Giovannone
J.D. Candidate, May 2005, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A.,
Rhetoric and Political Science with Honors, University of California at
Berkeley. I am eternally grateful to Professor Bryan Hull for inspiring and
supervising the evolution of this Note. Special thanks to John Teske and
Lauren Nungesser for their insightful comments and edits throughout, and to
the staff and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review whose toil made
this publication possible.
1714
